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STRUGGLING MIDDLE CLASS: MERIT-BASED
SCHOLARSHIPS MEET SCHOOL VOUCHERS
MARGARET E. AzHAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The American middle class is in the unique income category where
each family is making more money than it was a generation ago, yet,
after paying the bills, has less for discretionary spending and saving.'
Consequently, when an emergency arises, whether it be injury, illness, or
a job loss, many middle class families find themselves with no savings or
safety net of any kind.2 In fact, middle class families have been showing
increased signs of financial distress for decades, and are often only one
disaster or unexpected financial obligation away from bankruptcy.
3
One of the biggest expenses for the American middle class is the
cost of educating its children.4 In this Note, I suggest a system of merit-
based school vouchers to be used at primary and secondary schools in the
same manner merit-based scholarships are currently used at colleges and
universities. I believe such a system would be an ideal and workable solu-
tion to the increasing toll educational expenses are taking on the middle
class.
Part II discusses the hardships facing the middle class as a result of
the rising costs of education, with a brief discussion as to why a voucher
program would be helpful in alleviating them. Part III discusses the his-
tory of the use of public funds at religious and secular private schools in
America, and documents the changes in the Supreme Court's application
of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the Constitution. It is
important to consider the constitutionality of publicly funding religious
* J.D., 2010, Notre Dame Law School; B.A., 2007, Hillsdale College. I would
like to thank Kathryn Azhar, Elizabeth Azhar, and Dennis Czuchaj for all of their support
throughout my research and writing. I also want to thank my father, Abolfazl Azhar, for
fitting enough love and encouragement into nineteen years to last me a lifetime.
1. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, Two-INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE 8 (Basic Books, 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at6.
4. See infra Part II.
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institutions when discussing voucher programs because of the large num-
ber of private schools that are affiliated with a religion.5 While a voucher
system could be implemented exclusively within the public school sys-
tem, expanding the program to private schools would broaden the availa-
ble choices for parents. Part IV discusses the historic use of voucher
programs, as well as their present-day use in American schools, noting
the varying uses of vouchers both as a widespread solution and as an
individualized remedy. Part V discusses the many similarities between
primary and secondary school vouchers, and college and university schol-
arships. I suggest the possibility of merging the merit-based scholarships
used at colleges and universities with the need-based vouchers used at
many primary and secondary schools to create a merit-based voucher
program at the primary and secondary level. Part VI discusses the poten-
tial immediate effects of such a program on the middle class. Finally, Part
VII discusses the potential secondary effects of such a program, as well as
the various arguments supporting and opposing school voucher programs
as they exist today. While current voucher programs are not merit-based,
discussing the secondary effects such programs have had on the students
and families who have used them may help show the potential benefits of
expanding such programs to include merit-based vouchers as well.
II. THE BURDENED MIDDLE CLASS
Because so much of this discussion will focus on the middle class, it
is important to establish precisely what is meant the term means. Unfor-
tunately, there is no set definition for what it means to be "middle class,"
with different studies alternately stressing income, occupation, or educa-
tion as the determinant factor.6 Demographers have defined the middle
class as those living in households whose yearly income is clustered
around the nation's median income,7 which in 2007 was estimated to be
$50,740.8 Others have defined the middle class by non-financial charac-
teristics, applying the moniker only to those who have reached a certain
level of education (generally college), have health insurance, access to
credit, a commitment to saving and investing, and a confidence in the
5. See STEVEN P. BROUGHMAN, NANCY L. SWAIM, & PATRICK W. KEATON, U.S.
DEPT. OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES:
RESULTS FROM THE 2007-08 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 2 (2009), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009313.pdf.
6. Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 967-68 (1997).
7. Susan D. Carle, Re-valuing Lawyeringfor Middle-Income Clients, 70 FoRDHM
L. REV. 719, 721 (2001).
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, EARNINGS AND POVERTY DATA FROM THE
2007 AMERICAN COMMUNrrY SURVEY 3, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008
pubs/acs-09.pdf.
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availability of opportunities for economic advancement. 9 While not
exact, these characteristics give a fairly workable definition of the group
of Americans generally referred to as "middle class."
In recent years, the cost of education has placed an increasing bur-
den on middle-class families.'0 These families have moved in vast num-
bers to the suburbs to escape failing urban public schools." The public
school system was intended to provide equal educational opportunity to
all children, regardless of income, thereby giving them an equal chance at
life's economic opportunities.' 2 However, it has been said that "[flailing
schools impose an enormous cost on those children who are forced to
attend them, but they also inflict an enormous cost on those who
don't." 13 The failure of urban public schools to provide safe and quality
education has forced middle-class parents to internalize the cost of edu-
cating their children, rather than enjoying the benefits of a 100% publi-
cally subsidized education system. Middle-class families are often faced
with a choice between affordable housing near a poor urban school, and
expensive housing near a good, safe, and usually suburban school.14 Not
surprisingly, these families tend to leave the city for the suburbs to have
access to better-performing suburban schools, rather than send their chil-
dren to urban public schools.' 5
While public schools are publically subsidized,' 6 the nearby housing
is not, and middle-class Americans tend to pay for the privilege of
attending a high-quality suburban school indirectly through increased
housing costs. 17 Parents who are committed to providing their children
with a high-quality education are forced into what some have termed a
9. Carle, supra note 7, at 720.
10. Elizabeth Warren, Families Alone: The Changing Economics of Rearing Children,
58 OKLA. L. REv. 551, 551 (2005).
11. Id. at 554.
12. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 153 (2d ed. 1990)); Jason T. Vail, Note, School Vouchers and the Establish-
ment Clause: Is the First Amendment a Barrier to Improving Education for Low-Income
Children? 35 GONZ. L. REv. 187, 192 (1999-2000). Additionally, many states enacted a
public school system for the preservation of free government. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. of
1874, art. XIV, §1 (1968); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME.
CONST. art. VIII, PT. 1, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII,
§1; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); N.H. CONST. Pt. 2, art. 83; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §1;
RtI. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
13. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 23.
14. A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences,
103 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1277 (2005).
15. Michael E. Lewyn, The Urban Crisis: Made in Washington, 4 J.L. & POL'v
513, 530-31 (1996).
16. The cost of running public schools is funded indirectly through tax revenues,
most of which comes from local taxes, but some of which comes from state and federal
governments as well. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 153-55
17. See Warren, supra note 10, at 551.
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"bidding war" over houses in the "right" neighborhoods, with many of
them spending themselves into bankruptcy in the process."8 As a large
number of women have entered the workplace, single-income families
with stay-at-home mothers often find it nearly impossible to afford hous-
ing in a desirable school district.' 9 The free public school system "has
transformed into a private system in which families buy admission to a
decent school by purchasing expensive homes in a select few neighbor-
hoods."2 ° It is not unheard of for the quality of the nearby public school
system to be the single most important factor in the price of a home in
the suburbs.2 ' As a result, it is easy to imagine a middle-class family
essentially being priced out of a "free" public school because the cost of
living in a good school district is so high.
In addition to housing costs, middle-class families are paying
increased transportation costs. 22 Now that they must live further from
the city where they often work, middle-class parents are learning that
incomes from both parents are necessary to afford the mortgage pay-
ments in good-quality school districts.2 3 This often requires a second
family car and all the accompanying expenses.24
Meanwhile, most Americans consider a college education to be the
most important determinant in a young person's future success. 25 This
motivation to provide good education for their children begins well
before their children are high school age, with many parents struggling to
ensure their children get into the best elementary and pre-schools.
26
What is considered "adequate" education has been broadened to include
not only kindergarten through twelfth grade, but also two years of pre-
school and four years of college. 27 This means that even a 100% subsi-
dized K-12 public education system now only covers approximately 68%
of a middle class child's educational costs, leaving middle class families
struggling to come up with the remaining money.28 Once a middle class
family has managed to send its child to a good, safe school, it is con-
fronted with the ever-increasing costs of college tuition, which, in state
schools alone has nearly doubled in the past twenty-five years, and con-
tinues to rise.29
18. Id. at 569-70.
19. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 31.
20. Warren, supra note 10, at 551.
21. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 24; Warren, supra note 10, at 556-57.
22. See Warren, supra note 10, at 570-71.
23. Id. at 567-70.
24. Id. at 570-71; WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 47.
25. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 41.
26. Id at 37-39.
27. Warren, supra note 10, at 551.
28. Id. at 552.
29. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 42-43.
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Need-based school vouchers have been suggested, and implemented,
as one potential solution for providing a viable option to poor and eco-
nomically disadvantaged students trapped in under-performing public
schools.3" However, merit-based vouchers could also increase the quality
of non-suburban public school education or reduce the costs to more
families of sending their children to private schools. As a result, merit-
based voucher programs may also prove to be a substantial financial boon
to middle-class families struggling to make the tuition or mortgage pay-
ments that are often necessary to gain access to quality schools.
A merit-based voucher program could ease this burden by allowing
middle-class families to live in urban areas, or at least more affordable
suburban areas, and send their children to nearby private schools.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLICLY FUNDING
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Because of the large number of private schools that are affiliated
with a religion, it is important to discuss the effect such affiliation might
have on a voucher program that explicitly permits the use of public funds
at private, perhaps religious, schools. 3' State funding has long been used
to fund education both at secular and religious private schools. 32 How-
ever, the use of state funding at religious schools raises constitutional
issues, primarily regarding the First Amendment's prohibition of an
establishment of religion and its guarantee of freedom to exercise relig-
ion. 33 Recently, religious schools that have been denied public funding
precisely because they are religious have appealed to the courts under the
Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of equal protection under the laws
and application of the First Amendment to the states.
34
When dealing with the First Amendment's prohibition of an estab-
lishment of religion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court devel-
oped a litmus test to determine whether a state's private-school voucher
statute violated the Constitution.35 First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its primary or principal effect must be neutral
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See supra note 5 and accompanying test.
32. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
34. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall make or enforce any
law that abridges the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens or denies "to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See
discussion infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
35. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Lemon involved statutes in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island that provided for state aid to non-public schools or to non-public school-
teachers. Although these programs were limited to "secular" school subjects, the Court
held them both unconstitutional because they involved "an excessive entanglement
between government and religion" in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 603.
2010]
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(that is, it must neither advance nor inhibit religion); and third, it must
not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."36 To
determine whether an entanglement was "excessive" the Court examined
"the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority."37 The Court
explained that "excessive entanglement" might be found if the regulation
the statute required involved extensive or invasive inquiry into the way
religious schools were run.
3 8
The Lemon test's first two prongs came into the spotlight a few
years after the decision when a Kansas court struck down a state statute
authorizing the use of state funds at certain religious schools. In Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State v. Bubb, the court deter-
mined that giving public funds to "pervasively sectarian" schools in the
form of scholarships or educational grants inherently violated the test
because such schools served a primarily religious, not secular purpose.39
The court defined a "pervasively sectarian" school as one with a primarily
religious purpose rather than a secular one."° The school's primary pur-
pose could be determined by looking at factors such as whether the
school gave preferential admission to students of a certain religion or
denomination; whether religion classes were dogmatic rather than aca-
demic in nature; whether the school required religious participation such
as attending mass or chapel; whether the school imposed religious restric-
36. Id. at 612-13. See also Waltz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664,674
(1970) (examining whether a property tax exemption for religious organizations resulted
in "an excessive government entanglement with religion"); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ("The test may be stated as follows: what are the
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibi-
tion of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circum-
scribed by the Constitution.").
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
38. Id. at 607-609, 620. Specifically in Lemon, the Court determined that "[a]
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be
required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise
respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the
extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limita-
tions imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive
and enduring entanglement between state and church." Id. at 619.
39. 379 F. Supp. 872, 893 (D. Kan. 1974). In Bubb, the Court noted that pri-
mary and secondary parochial schools fail this test as their primary purpose is to inculcate
religion into their young students. According to the court, "academic freedom and the
quest for truth" require a non-sectarian environment making state aid to religious col-
leges easier to constitutionally validate than similar aid to parochial schools. Id. at 891.
The Court later mentioned in passing that a "tuition grant program" at the primary and
secondary education levels would usually create excessive entanglement issues. Id. at 894.
40. Id at 892-93.
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tions on faculty members; and whether the school required some affirma-
tion of certain religious beliefs for admission or graduation. 4'
Under the Bubb rationale, giving state funding to nearly any relig-
ious primary or secondary school would seem to violate the Lemon test.42
However, not all courts rejected state funding of pervasively sectarian
schools. Using predominately the same criteria as the court in Bubb, a
North Carolina court upheld a state statute giving state funds to two
private sectarian colleges.4 3 Although the court found that the colleges
involved were pervasively sectarian, it did not believe the schools were
pervasively sectarian enough to offend the Establishment Clause. 44 The
district court held that although the state's funding of the secular goals of
the school was necessarily freeing up more of the colleges' funds to be
used for sectarian goals, this effect was too indirect to violate the Consti-
tution.45 Rather, because the aid primarily benefited the student, not the
institution, and the state's supervision of the funds required little govern-
ment involvement, this statute satisfied the Lemon test.4 6 Similarly in
1986, the Supreme Court held that a state vocational rehabilitation pro-
gram that funded a blind student's education and missionary training at
a religious college was not an impermissible advancement of religion.4 7
Rather, because the purpose of the legislation was to benefit the visually
handicapped, not provide religious instruction, the funding met the
Lemon criteria.
48
In 1985, the Supreme Court also addressed the issue of public funds
being used at private schools in School District of the City of Grand Rapids
v. Ball.49 This case involved a supplemental school program for non-
public school children, taught at the non-public schools but paid for at
public expense. 50 The Court ultimately struck down the program as
unconstitutional under the Lemon test, holding that it unduly entangled
the government in religious matters and impermissibly promoted relig-
41. Id. at 881-82, 885, 892-93.
42. See id. at 891.
43. Smith v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 429 F. Supp. 871, 879
(W.D.N.C. 1977).
44. Id. at 879. Although these schools required religion courses and trained some
students for seminary, the state's contract with the schools required that the scholarships/
grants not be used for students "pursuing a course of study primarily designed to prepare
the student for a career in a religions vocation." Id. at 878-79.
45. Id. at 878.
46. Id. at 879; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9-11
(1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the state from furnish-
ing a sign language interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) to a deaf child in a sectarian school because the IDEA has a purely secular pur-
pose and the child is the main beneficiary, while the school only benefits incidentally).
47. Witters v. Wash. Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986).
48. Id. at 485-86.
49. Sch. Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1985).
50. Id.
2010]
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ion.5" In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the "pervasively
sectarian nature of the school[ ]" may influence the state paid instructors
to "subtly or overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious ten-
ets at public expense." 52 Notably, by this rationale the mere possibility
that providing funds to a religious school "may" result in public funds
promoting religion would be sufficient to violate the Lemon test.
Fortunately, in Agostini v. Felton the Supreme Court clarified the
proper application of the Lemon test, rejecting the premises on which
Ball was based. 53 Agostini involved a federally funded program that pro-
vided remedial education on a neutral basis for disadvantaged children by
government employees on the premises of sectarian schools. 54 Up until
this point, the Court had relied on four assumptions: (i) "any public
employee who works on a religious school's premises is presumed to
inculcate religion in her work"; (ii) "the presence of public employees on
private school premises creates an impermissible symbolic union between
church and state"; (iii) "any public aid that directly aids the educational
function of religious schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrina-
tion, even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private
decision-making"; and (iv) "public employees who teach on religious
school premises must be closely monitored to ensure that they do not
inculcate religion." 55 In Agostini, the Court began by rejecting the
assumptions that "placement of public employees on parochial school
grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion," and that "all government aid that directly assists the educa-
tional function of religious schools is invalid." '56 Instead, the Court rec-
ognized that when public money ends up at a religious institution, it is
not a violation of the Establishment Clause if it does so "only as a result
of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals."5 7 The
Court concluded that the federally funded program at issue gave no
incentive for anyone to modify their religious beliefs, nor did it result in
an excessive entanglement between church and state.
58
In the same vein, the Court also upheld the constitutionality of a
state program that dispensed funds to state and local educational agencies
that lend books, media, and computer software to public and private
51. Id. at 385.
52. Id. at 397.
53. 521 U.S. 203, 205 (1997).
54. Id. at 232 (holding that, because services are provided on the basis of relig-
iously neutral criteria, it does not create incentives for anyone "to modify their religious
beliefs or practices in order to obtain those services").
55. Id. at 222.
56. Id. at 223, 225.
57. Id. at 226 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
58. Id. at 232-33.
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primary and secondary schools in Mitchell v. Helms.59 The Court's new
position established that as long as no distinction is made between vari-
ous religious groups, or between religious and non-religious groups, and
the government's secular purpose is adequately furthered, the religious
nature of the recipient should not matter.6 ° In Mitchell, the Court partic-
ularly noted that to exclude religious schools from the program would be
to exhibit outright hostility toward those who "take their religion seri-
ously . . . [or] who make the mistake of being effective in transmitting
their views to children."
61
In Mitchell, the Court in a plurality opinion rejected the dissent's
reliance on the pervasively sectarian nature of the school as a factor in its
constitutionality analysis.62 The relevance of this factor was in "sharp
decline," the Court noted, and it "took pains to emphasize the narrow-
ness" of the category.63 Furthermore, the Court determined that the
main issue should be the primary purpose of the state in enacting the
law, not the religious beliefs of the recipient, and moreover, the inquiry
into the recipient's beliefs was not only unnecessary, but "offensive" and
"profoundly troubling." '64 The Court distanced itself from the "shameful
pedigree" of the pervasively sectarian factor, officially burying it.65
The Supreme Court extended this new rationale in 2002 when it
addressed the Establishment Clause's application to state school voucher
programs, which dispensed public funds to many religious elementary
and high schools.66 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court emphasized
the intent of the legislature over the religious or non-religious nature of
the school when it held that an Ohio voucher program did not violate
59. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801-02, 805 (2000). The Court concluded
that if the state makes no distinction between the religious and the irreligious, "it is a
mystery which view of religion the government has established, and thus a mystery what
the constitutional violation would be." Id. at 827.
60. Id. at 827.
61. Id. at 827-28.
62. Id. at 826 ("[T]here was a period when this factor mattered ... [b]ut that
period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past."). See id. at
886-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826.
64. Id. at 827. Additionally, consideration of this factor butted up against the
Court's prohibition of discrimination in giving public benefits based on religious status.
dat 828.
65. Id. at 828-29. The Court documented the bigoted hostility toward Catholics
in the 1870s when the term "sectarian" was code for "Catholic." Because "sectarian" on
its face could apply to a religious school of any sect, the Court coined the phrase "perva-
sively sectarian" which almost exclusively applied to Catholic parochial schools. Both
terms were intended as a means of excluding Catholics and Catholic schools from any
sort of government aid. Congress even considered a constitutional amendment to bar any
aid to sectarian institutions. Id.
66. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002). The Court believed
"that the program challenged here is a program of true private choice ... and thus
constitutional." Id.
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the Establishment Clause because the program was enacted for a purely
secular reason: education.6 7 If a few, or even all, of the parents chose to
use those funds at religious schools, it would be the parents who were
indirectly advancing a religious ideology, not the state.6 8 For proponents
of school vouchers, the Zelman decision was seen as a landmark case on
par with Brown v. Board of Education in its "potential to equalize educa-
tion opportunities for [economically] disadvantaged students."
69
Two years later, the Court reaffirmed this position in Locke v.
Davey.70 In Locke, a student was denied a state scholarship for which he
was otherwise eligible, solely because he chose to be a theology major. 7'
The Court reversed the lower court's ruling, reasoning that although the
Establishment Clause permits states to issue public scholarships to stu-
dents pursuing an exclusively religious degree such as devotional theol-
ogy, the Free Exercise Clause does not require them to.7 2 Because of this,
individual states are left to decide for themselves whether public funding
for religious education is permitted by their own constitutions and cur-
rent voucher programs.
73
While the schools at issue in Zelman were elementary and high
schools, the Court's decision soon affected the use of grants and scholar-
ships at colleges and universities as well. Based on the Zelman holding,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver,
recently held that because the Establishment Clause allows the even-
handed funding of both religious and secular education through student
scholarships, excluding pervasively sectarian institutions from state schol-
arship programs was a violation of the Establishment, Free Exercise, and
Equal Protection clauses. 74 In fact, because the statute at issue required
an investigation to determine if a religious school was "pervasively secta-
rian," and therefore excluded, the court viewed even the investigation
itself as an unconstitutionally excessive entanglement.
75
While it is now well-established that the U.S. Constitution does not
prohibit the use of public funds for education in religious institutions,
thereby clearing the way for voucher programs, some state courts have
67. Id
68. Id. at 652-53.
69. Martha M. McCarthy, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: A Victory for School
Vouchers, 171 EDuc. L. REP. 1, 11 (2003) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347
U.S. 483 (1954)).
70. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
71. Id. at 717, 719.
72. Id. at 718-19, 725.
73. Ellen M. Halstead, After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, School Voucher Programs
Can Exclude Religious Schools, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 147, 148-49 (2004).
74. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.
2008).
75. Id. at 1261-62.
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held that it violates their state's constitution. 76 However, if, as Zelman
and its progeny held, the federal Constitution allows state voucher pro-
grams to be used at religious schools, and as the Tenth Circuit recently
held, it actually prohibits the exclusion of religious colleges and universi-
ties from state scholarship programs, it may soon be argued that any state
voucher program must include religious primary and secondary schools.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that many state constitutions
include clauses, such as "no aid" provisions, that specifically prohibit any
public monies from being used to support or aid any sect, church, relig-
ious denomination or sectarian institution.77 Regardless of how the
trending jurisprudence resolves these issues, Supreme Court precedent,
and the Zelman decision in particular, establish that the First Amend-
ment will not prevent a voucher program from allowing public funds to
be used at private religious schools.
IV. HISTORY OF VOUCHER PROGRAMS:
ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION
A. The Start of School Vouchers
School vouchers allow parents to use public funds to send their chil-
dren to private school.78 While other means, such as private scholarships,
often effectuate the same result, they are not generally considered to be
vouchers.79 The fundamental characteristics of voucher programs, as
opposed to private scholarships, is that vouchers are composed of fund-
ing provided by the government and used to enroll a school-age child in a
school, usually private, that has been chosen by that child's parent.8"
While they have not become hotly debated until relatively recently,
education voucher programs have existed in the United States in some
form since the 1800s, when school districts without public schools paid
for the students in those districts to attend the area's existing private
76. David M. Kirkham, Introduction to Symposium: Educational Choice: Emerging
Legal and Policy Issues 2008 BYU L. REv. 227, 228 (2008).
77. Id. For example, Missouri's constitution provides: "[t]hat no person can be
compelled to erect, support or attend any place or system of worship, or to maintain or
support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of any sect, church, creed or denomina-
tion of religion." Mo. CONsr. art. I, § 6. Florida has a similar provision. See FLA.
CONST. art I, § 3. See also Jason S. Marks, What Wall? School Vouchers and Church-State
Separation after Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 58 J. MO. B. 354, 358 (2002) [hereinafter
Marks, What Walll; Emily Wexler, Privatization of Public Education: An Examination of
US. and Canadian Policy and Trends Utilizing Vouchers that Indirectly Aid Sectarian
Schools, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 327, 333-34 (2007).
78. Wexler, supra note 77, at 327.
79. See Patrick J. Wolf, School Voucher Programs: What the Research Says About
Parental School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REv. 415, 417 (2008).
80. Id.
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schools. 8 The modern concept of the school voucher program first
entered the mainstream conscience in the 1950s when Nobel laureate
economist Milton Friedman suggested that a more free-market approach
to education would invite competition, thereby forcing lower-performing
public schools to improve or else lose students and funding.8 2 Friedman
believed that vouchers could remedy the two fatal flaws of the public
school system: bureaucratic inefficiency and the wide variations in quality
between different public schools.83 By placing school funding in the
hands of parents, vouchers would put control in the hands of those most
capable of, and interested in, securing a good education for the children
involved.84 By allowing a market structure to distribute funding to
schools, children would be able to access better schools and failing
schools would be forced to cut out bureaucracy and improve, or else, in a
sense, go out of business.
85
Years later, Professors John E. Coons and Steven Sugarman revived
the issue in their book, Education by Choice.8 6 They promoted vouchers
primarily as a means of ensuring quality education for poor children.
8 7
Then, in the 1990s, Professors John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe wrote
a book discussing vouchers further, elaborating on Friedman's idea that
the institutional nature of public schools led to their bureaucratization
and the resultant inefficiencies, and that it was the free-market approach
of private schools that enabled them to be more successful than their
public counterparts.88 After a while, the popularity of the idea gained
support and various states and cities began to implement voucher
programs.
B. The Current State of Voucher Programs
Florida was the first state to implement a state-wide voucher pro-
gram that included all schools, even religious private schools.89 However,
81. Halstead, supra note 73, at 150-51. These programs exist in Maine and Ver-
mont, although Vermont's program began specifically excluding religious schools in 1961
to satisfy its own state constitution. Id. at 165.
82. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 153; Marks, What Wall?, supra
note 77, at 354; Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of Sectarian Education: Establishment and
Free Exercise Clause Implications, 2 GEO MASON IND. L. REv. 7, 13 (1993); Vail, supra
note 12, at 192-96.
83. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 152-58.
84. Id. at .160.
85. See id. at 161.
86. See Ira Bloom, The New Parental Rights Challenge to School Controk Has the
Supreme Court Mandated School Choice?, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 139, 148-49 (2003).
87. JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN SUGARMAN, EDUCATION By CHOICE: THE
CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 11 (1978).
88. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 3, 28-66 (1990); Bloom, supra note 86, at 148-50.
89. Wexler, supra note 77, at 341.
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in Bush v. Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court determined that allowing
vouchers to be used at sectarian schools violated the state's constitu-
tion.90 Interestingly, rather than address the religious nature of the
schools, the court took a new route, striking down the program as violat-
ing the state's "uniformity clause."9 ' Florida is not unique in this, as
several other states have "uniformity" clauses as well. 92 However, many
have not interpreted them as prohibiting voucher programs and some
even currently have functioning school choice programs.
93
Cleveland's voucher program is one that has been widely discussed,
as it was the program that Zelman upheld.94 It was in Zelman that the
Court looked past the religious nature of schools receiving voucher funds
and concentrated on the intentions of the legislature creating the voucher
program and issuing the vouchers.95 The Zelman decision brought the
issue of vouchers into the public mind, and the number of school
voucher programs in the United States jumped from five to twelve in the
five years immediately following the decision.9 6
90. 919 So. 2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006). See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Jason S.
Marks, Spackle for the Wall? Public Funding for School Vouchers After Locke v. Davey, 61 J.
Mo. B. 150, 156 (2005) [hereinafter Spackle for the Wall?].
91. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 409-410. Florida's state constitution states that
"[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high
quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality educa-
tion and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher
learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require."
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Some consider the court's analysis to be lacking because it
neither addressed the significance of the religious nature of the schools nor established a
standard for what "uniform" means. See, e.g., Jamie Dycus, Lost Opportunity: Bush v.
Holmes and Application of State Constitutional Uniformity Clauses to School Voucher
Schemes, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 415, 416 (2006).
92. ARiz. CONST. art. XI, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. IX,
1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.M. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2;
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; S.D. CONST. art VIII, § 1;
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See
also Rose v. Counsel for Better Educ., Inc. 790 S.W.2d 186, 189, 211-12 (Ky. 1989)
(interpreting Kentucky's constitutional mandate that the General Assembly provide for
an "efficient system of common schools throughout the state" as also requiring schools to
be "substantially uniform"); Dycus, supra note 91, at 417-18.
93. See, e.g., Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 537 (Wis. 1992) (upholding
school choice program because state constitution's uniformity clause requires only uni-
formity in the "character of instruction"); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 628
(Wis. 1998) (holding that state's attempt to improve education via school choice program
does not deny any student the basic education guaranteed in the state constitution);
Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 730-31 (Idaho 1993)
("[T]he uniformity requirement in the education clause requires only uniformity in cur-
riculum, not uniformity in funding.").
94. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
95. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
96. Wolf, supra note 79, at 419.
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There are currently twelve school voucher programs in the United
States, spanning across nine states.97 Eligibility requirements range from
those open to students in a public school or public school system that
had been determined to be "failing," to those only open to physically or
mentally handicapped students, to those open only to foster children.9"
Many modern voucher programs are implemented due to the perceived
poor condition of the local public schools, and the funds are generally
aimed at low-income students who would otherwise be unable to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by nearby private schools. 99
C. Vouchers as an Individualized Remedy
(a.k.a. Court-Mandated Vouchers)
There is a separate thread of cases addressing the constitutional
rights of students who are trapped in public schools that fall below the
standards set by their state constitutions."' Nearly every state guarantees
its citizens the right to education, and more than half include the addi-
tional requirement that the education provided be of some quality, rang-
ing from adequate to high.' 1 Relying on these provisions, individuals
have sued their state for failing to provide the quality of that education its
constitution guarantees to its citizens.1 0 2 Courts have granted what
amounts to private school vouchers on an individual basis for children
who are not receiving adequate education in the public schools.10 3 This
is not an unusual practice, as courts have created similar voucher-like
remedies when finding constitutional violations in cases involving public
housing, mental hospitals, and prisons. 0 Alternatively, some state
97. See id. at 418; The Foundation for Educational Choice, http://www.friedman
foundation.org/schoolchoice/ShowProgram.do.
98. See Wolf supra note 79, at 418; The Foundation for Educational Choice, supra
note 97.
99. Spackle for the Wall?, supra note 90, at 151.
100. Greg. D. Andres, Comment, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education
Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 797-802 (1995).
101. Mississippi is the only state whose constitution does not guarantee its citi-
zens' rights to an education. Id. at 795, n.1. Of the other states, seventeen only require
that a system of free public schools exist; twenty-two add a requirement of quality (ade-
quate, thorough, or efficient); six require a high quality; and four cite education as an
important duty of the state. Id. at 818, n.116.
102. Id. at 797-801.
103. See Straube v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1173-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, state
funding will provide reimbursement for tuition at an approved private school if public
school fails to provide appropriate free public education). See also Simchick v. Fairfax
County Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 323-24 (4th Cir. 2009); Byrnes v. Riles, 204 Cal. Rptr.
100, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
104. Andres, supra note 100, at 809; Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell,
The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HArv. L. REv. 465, 489
(1980).
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courts have held that there is no remedy through the court system for the
state's failure to provide the quality of education described in its
constitution.
1 05
V. MERIT-BASED VOUCHERS AND MERIT-BASED SCHOLARSHIPS
A. Similarities between Vouchers and Scholarships
While the issue of school vouchers is still hotly debated, there is a
much more forgiving mind-set toward publicly funding private educa-
tion when it is at the post-secondary level.1 °6 This distinction seems to
be primarily one of public opinion, as there does not seem to be any
substantive legal difference between the two regimes. Both are programs
through which public money is given directly to individuals, who are
then free to use those monies at the school of their choice. The differing
attitudes toward publicly funded education is notable because the system
which currently exists at the post-secondary education level is essentially
a voucher program, where the words "scholarship" and "grant" seem to
be substituted for the word "voucher." 117 The similarities between these
two systems are readily apparent.
Like colleges and universities, education at the primary and secon-
dary level is available at both public and private schools, although there is
a much greater number of public primary and secondary school facilities
than there are private.10 8 The private schools at either education level can
be secular or religious. 10 9 At the post-secondary level, the number of stu-
dents enrolled at each school is comparable, while at the primary and
secondary levels, the private schools tend to be smaller.11 0 Also, at both
levels, the quality of the public schools range from low quality to prestigi-
105. Andres, supra note 100, at 818.
106. Mark Strasser, Death by A Thousand Cuts: The Illusory Safeguards against
Funding Pervasively Sectarian Institutions of Higher Learning, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 353, 353
(2008).
107. Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84
MARQ. L. REV. 301, 375 (2000).
108. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FAST FACTS,
available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=84.
109. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., Table 255:
Degree-granting institutions, by control and type of institution: Selected years, 1949-50
through 2006-07, available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d07/tables/dtO7_
255.asp.
110. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TABLE 225:
ENROLLMENT OF THE 120 LARGEST DEGREE-GRANING COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITY
CAMPUSES, BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS AND INSTITUTIONS: FALL 2005 (2006),
available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d07/tables/dtO7_225.asp?referrer=
list; NAT'LCTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF
PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2007-08 PRIVATE
SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 2 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pub-
sinfo.asp?pubid =2009313.
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ous and highly respected.11 And, although perhaps not on the same
scale, privately funded scholarships exist at the primary and secondary
level as well as at the university level.
1 12
However, students have much greater freedom in choosing their
post-secondary school because, although remaining near to family and
friends may be a factor in their decision, their choice need not be directly
related to their address to the degree that it is in primary and secondary
education. Another important difference is that, whereas it is well-known
that university grants and scholarships often factor in athletic or aca-
demic performance as well as financial need, a student's academic merit
has traditionally not been a factor in primary and secondary level
voucher programs."1 3 This is because the intention among school
voucher advocates is primarily to benefit poor children who lack the
funds to leave the public system.' 14
B. Merit-Based Vouchers as an Alternative
to the Current System
Because most voucher programs were designed to help lower-
income families, 1 5 they are typically dispensed exclusively based on
need.116 Accordingly, depending on where the income eligibility line is
drawn, middle-class families often find themselves excluded from enroll-
ment in voucher programs. This places them in the unfortunate position
of having incomes too high to qualify for need-based voucher aid, but
too low to afford quality education on their own. Because of this, a
merit-based voucher program would be ideal in alleviating the financial
111. This is evidenced by the struggle of middle-class families to afford houses in
areas with "good" schools, and the existence of voucher programs in general as a solution
for those children stuck in poor quality or failing schools. See supra Part II.
112. See The Foundation for Educational Choice, supra note 97. It should be
noted that some states (namely Arizona, Georgia, Florida, Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island) offer tax credits for donations to privately funded scholarships, while other states
(Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana and Minnesota) offer tax credits for educational expenses in
general. Id. While these may not fit within the traditional definition of "vouchers," an
expansion of such programs may well provide an alternate means of achieving the same
result.
113. Wolf, supra note 79, at 418. Two of the twelve existing state voucher pro-
grams provide vouchers for rural areas with no public schools; three programs strictly
require a financial means test; five programs only provide vouchers for disabled children;
one program admits only foster children; and one program requires attendance at a con-
tinually failing public school. See The Foundation for Educational Choice, supra note 97.
114. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12; Bloom, supra note 86, at
148-49, 155-56.
115. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
116. Spackle for the Wall?, supra note 90, at 151. Usually the requirement is
financial need, although other voucher programs dispense vouchers based on the unavail-
ability of local public schools, or only to disabled or foster children. See The Foundation
for Educational Choice, supra note 97.
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burden education has placed on the middle class. Although there are
many who oppose voucher programs,1 17 such a program may not be as
difficult to achieve as it may first appear. It would only require the mar-
riage of merit-based college scholarships with state need-based voucher
programs for primary and secondary schools, both of which are already
in place.
Merit-based college scholarships are not a new development. For
years, the federal government has been funding the Robert C. Byrd
National Honors Scholarship, the first federal merit-based scholarship
program, which grants money to states, and allows the states' educational
agencies to decide requirements for eligibility.1 18 Additionally, twenty-
two states currently fund completely or partially merit-based college
scholarships. 19 Some states focus exclusively on qualifications such as
grade point average and standardized test scores, while others take family
income into account as well.1 2 ° The states' goals in implementing these
programs tend to be the encouragement of higher performance in high
schools and matriculation to in-state colleges and universities, while pro-
viding financial assistance to middle-class families.
1 2 1
We have already established that there are currently several func-
tioning voucher programs.122 If these two methods of educational aid are
combined into one program, it could provide much-needed support for
middle-class families. Any program in which academic merit is a signifi-
cant factor in determining eligibility would be somewhat helpful to many
middle-class families, even if the amount of the voucher were to be
phased out depending on the family's income.
However, for such vouchers to provide significant help to the mid-
dle class they would have to be primarily based on merit, with any phase-
outs or income limitations set at much higher dollar amounts than limi-
tations in the current need-based programs. The current need-based
voucher programs in Minnesota, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C.,
for example, are only available to families making less than 175%, 185%,
or 250% of the federal poverty level, respectively. 123 The federal poverty
117. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
118. Erin Oehler, The Door To Higher Education: Accessible to All? Whether State-
Funded Merit-Aid Programs Discriminate Against Minorities and the Poor, 10 SCHOLAR
499, 521-22 (2008).
119. Id. at 523-27; Kristen Poe, Note, Blinded by Results: Is Looking to GPA in
Addition to Standardized Test Scores Truly a Less Discriminatory Solution to Merit Scholar-
ship Selection?, 19 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 181, 184 (1998).
120. See generally Oehler, supra note 118, at 523-27 (discussing the HOPE pro-
gram in Georgia, the MEAP program in Michigan, the Millennium Scholarship Program
in Nevada, and the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program in Tennessee).
121. Id. at 520-21.
122. See supra Part IV.
123. Tax Credits and Deductions for Educational Expenses, The Foundation for
Educational Choice, http://www.edchoice.org/schoolchoice/ShowProgramltem.do?id=24
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level for 2007 was $20,650 for a family of four. 124 If we, like most
demographers, suppose middle-class families to be those families making
approximately the median income in the United States, which, in 2007
was $50,740,125 then the average middle-class family would be earning
246% of the federal poverty level. Under the current need-based voucher
programs most, and in some cases all, of the middle class is ineligible for
vouchers. Thus, even a voucher partially based on merit would be
unhelpful if it was completely phased out below the middle class income
level, as are many current need-based vouchers.
It is for this reason that purely merit-based vouchers would be ideal
for middle-class families. Currently, a middle-class family can either send
its children to a nearby public school, or pay completely out-of-pocket to
enroll its child in a private school. A merit-based voucher program would
allow those parents to take some of the public school funding with them
when they transfer their child to a private school. To be effective, the
program need not entirely pay the cost of the private school. Even if
middle-class voucher recipients were allowed to take only a percentage of
the amount the local public school is spending on their child's education
and use that percentage toward private school tuition, these families
could save thousands of dollars in educational expenses per child.'26
Additionally, by loosening the tight relationship between address and
school quality, a well-designed voucher program could remove a signifi-
cant financial burden from the shoulders of many middle- and low-
income families. 27 Families that could not previously afford to send
their children to private schools could find private education finally
within their financial reach.12 8
Were a purely merit-based program politically infeasible, such a pro-
gram could also be enacted in conjunction with the need-based programs
already in effect. There could be one category of vouchers of a certain
pre-determined monetary amount available to low-income families, with
a phase-out as the family income increased. Once a family's income is
(Minnesota); Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program, The Foundation
for Educational Choice, http://www.edchoice.org/schoolchoice/ShowProgramltem.do?id
=43 (New Orleans); Opportunity Scholarship Program, The Foundation for Educational
Choice, http://www.edchoice.org/schoolchoice/ShowProgramltem.do?id=13 (Washing-
ton, D.C.).
124. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 3147 (Jan 24,
2007). The most recent calculation of the average United States income was for 2007.
125. U.S. CENSUS BuREAU, supra note 8, at 3.
126. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 161.
127. See WAREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 34.
128. While merit-based vouchers would not enable every child from every
underperforming school to attain a better education, they are not intended as a cure-all to
the problems in American education. This Note suggests them merely as a reasonable way
to give more children access to better education and to ease the financial burden on the
American middle class.
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"too" high, such that the family no longer qualifies for the need-based
voucher, the family could apply for a merit-based voucher. Even if the
merit-based vouchers are worth a smaller dollar amount than the need-
based vouchers, middle-class families would still see a significant reduc-
tion in their education expenses.
C. Constitutionality of Merit-Based Vouchers
As noted above, the Supreme Court has already determined in
Zelman that voucher programs, even those that dispensed money to stu-
dents attending private religious schools, do not violate the U.S. Consti-
tution.12 9 Under the current constitutional analysis, the focus for any
new voucher program would be on the intention of the legislature in
enacting the program, not the religious or non-religious nature of the
schools involved in the program. 131 It seems this fairly liberal standard
would also embrace any new programs, regardless of slightly different
requirements for eligibility, as long as they are implemented with essen-
tially the same goal: providing quality education.
Furthermore, as also noted above, the Tenth Circuit recently went
so far as to hold that it is unconstitutional to exclude sectarian universi-
ties from state scholarship programs.1 1 Even if this were not the case, a
merit-based voucher program presumably could be successful even if it
excluded all religious schools. However, because the vast majority of pri-
vate schools in the United States are religious, 132 such exclusion would
effectively cut out private schools completely. A merit-based voucher pro-
gram that excluded all religious schools could potentially exclude all the
high-performing schools in disadvantaged urban areas. Consequently,
such a voucher program would be of little help to many middle-class
parents who reside in urban areas. Additional measures would have to be
implemented to make such a limited voucher program effective. Such
vouchers could, for example, be supplemented with additional funding
either to cover the cost of transporting children to the nearest high-per-
forming schools, or by purchasing additional school buses and hiring
more drivers.
A merit-based voucher program could still be beneficial even despite
potential legal setbacks. For example, the Supreme Court could reverse
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Colorado Christian, or other circuits might
merely decide the issue differently. This would mean voucher programs
would not be required to include the nearby religious schools, but they
129. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653; see also supra Part III.
130. Zelman, 536, U.S. at 653.
131. Colo. Christian, 534 F.3d at 1258, 1269.
132. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2007-08 PI-
VATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 2 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/
pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2009313.
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would also not be barred from such inclusion. Similarly, some states have
already held that their own constitutions' "no aid" provisions prevent
them from including religious private schools in their voucher pro-
grams.' This means that any voucher program in such a state has to
exclude religious schools. Though both situations limit the number of
schools in the program, thereby limiting parental choice, they still
expand parental choice beyond the local public school in their district.
Middle-class families still benefit because parents would not have to live
in expensive houses for their children to attend good public schools.
VI. EFFECTS OF A MERIT-BASED VOUCHER PROGRAM
ON THE MIDDLE CLASS
A voucher program by its very nature allows parents a greater degree
of choice in deciding where their children go to school. Therefore,
regardless of whether a given program includes religious and secular pri-
vate schools, or is limited exclusively to public schools, it takes a step
toward breaking down the strong relationship between where a student
lives and which school he or she attends. Because of this, even a limited
merit-based voucher program would benefit families who cannot afford
to live in good school districts, but still seek to provide their children
with safe and effective education.
A voucher program that breaks down the relationship between place
of residence and the school which is attended would allow middle-class
families either to purchase houses in less expensive neighborhoods,
thereby reducing mortgage costs, or purchase houses closer to work,
thereby reducing transportation costs. By spending a few thousand dol-
lars each year to cover the gap between the amount of the voucher and
the full cost of tuition, many middle-class families could potentially save
a great deal more in housing and transportation costs. Even a more lim-
ited program wherein vouchers could be used exclusively at public
schools' 3 4 would still allow middle-class families to live in lower-cost
housing in more affordable neighborhoods and have their children
bussed to a better school in a different district. This could be something
as simple as allowing any student to attend any public school, then pro-
viding a "transportation voucher" to cover costs of transportation up to a
certain amount.
Such a program would provide benefits even to those families whose
children do not have sufficiently high grades to qualify for a merit-based
voucher. These families would still need to live in "good" school districts
to attend the better schools. However, the demand for this housing
would be lower because many of the parents formerly competing for it
would no longer have to do so. Every student who received a voucher
133. See supra notes 73-74, 78 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part V.C.
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would no longer need to live in "good" school districts, reducing the
competition for those houses, and thereby likely reducing the prices for
them. The thousands of dollars that could be saved during the course of
a child's primary and secondary education, either from tuition, housing
costs, or transportations cost, would enable middle-class families to put
more resources away for their children's college expenses, thereby reliev-
ing the pressures associated with rising college tuition costs.
VII. SECONDARY EFFECTS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Changes to the status quo do not benefit everyone equally. Many
middle-class families have already invested huge amounts of time and
money to gain access to quality education according to the current
"rules."' 13 5 There are also plenty of individuals and groups who are hostile
to voucher programs because of the changes they expect the programs
would effect.
A. Financial Effects
Were a school voucher program effectively to divorce school quality
from high housing prices, families unable to afford living in expensive
school districts would benefit by still having the opportunity to send
their children to quality schools. The transportation costs that accom-
pany a house in the suburbs would also be eliminated. Middle-class fami-
lies who already send their children to private schools would benefit as
well because the voucher would remove some of the financial burden of
tuition payments. However, those currently living in the expensive dis-
tricts, including those without children, would likely see the value of
their homes decline. 136 This is not an unsubstantial concern, because the
home is the most valuable asset of most Americans. 137 The early propo-
nent of school vouchers, Milton Friedman, believed the poor would be
the primary beneficiaries of a school voucher program, whereas the mid-
dle class would only benefit moderately. 138 However, even if Friedman is
correct, given the fact that families with children are now 75% more
likely to fail to make timely credit card payments than a family without
any children, 139 it is likely that middle-class families with children, strug-
gling to make tuition (or credit card) payments, would be quite pleased
with only "moderate" help.
135. See supra Part II.
136. See James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 393, 410 (2008) ("Those whose homes' value currently depend on being in a 'good
school system' would see a drop in the value of their homes.").
137. Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims,
87 Tux. L. REv. 121, 123 (2009).
138. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 169.
139. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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Because voucher programs merely redistribute the money each state
already spends on education, they do not require any net increase in
taxes.' 40 However, there could be a significant financial effect on the
schools involved in the programs. As students transfer to more desirable
schools, they will take with them the funding previously spent at their
old school. This would result in a diversion of public funds from the
schools students leave to the new schools in which they enroll. Far from
being a detriment, this redistribution of funds is precisely the result pro-
ponents of voucher programs such as Friedman desire. 41 The loss of
funding is intended to give failing schools the incentive to improve, while
rewarding successful schools for their performance.
14 2
At the same time, voucher programs can be structured so that losing
the funding associated with a student who transfers to another school can
benefit the students who remain behind. If the vouchers are equal to less
than the amount the government spends on each student, then, when a
voucher recipient leaves one school for another school, he would only be
taking a percentage of the funding the state was spending on him. The
remaining funds could still be used at the failing school, effectively rais-
ing that school's per-student funding.143 In the Cleveland program, for
example, vouchers issued to be used at private schools were worth up to
$2,250 a student, 44 while the public schools were receiving $4,167 per
student in state funding.14
5
B. Effects on Performance
Clearly, the allure of a voucher program is the hope that it will
enable students to have access to higher quality education. To many,
high-performing public schools seem "more like private clubs than public
parks when it comes to the issue of access."' 46 Proponents of voucher
programs look to introduce competition among schools as a means of
allowing parents more educational choices, both in terms of quality and
type of education. 147 They forecast that "marketplace models ...will
140. Vail, supra note 12, at 199.
141. See supra Part IV.A; notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. See Vail, supra note 12, at 195-96, 213-14. Alternately, the remaining funds
could potentially also be used as an opportunity to lower taxes or fund even more
vouchers.
144. Bloom, supra note 86, at 160.
145. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 654, n.3. In total, the public schools in Zelman were
receiving $7,097 in public funding per student, $4,167 of which was attributable to the
state, not the local government.
146. Ryan, supra note 136, at 408.
147. See McCarthy, supra note 69, at 1. "If the market should replace the govern-
ment as the primary regulatory mechanism for schools, then parents would have more
discretion to ensure that their children's education is consistent with their personal beliefs
and values." Id. at 10.
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improve public and private education, because inferior schools will be
eliminated through competition. "148 In addition to competition, some
hope that removing some students from public schools will improve the
conditions for those who remain behind because fewer students means
smaller class sizes and, therefore, more opportunities for one-on-one
instruction.
1 49
Opponents disagree with many of these predictions, however. Some
believe that voucher programs will "create government entanglement
with religious institutions, increase economic and racial segregation
across schools, or have negative consequences for public schools' democ-
ratizing function." 51 Others question the accountability of private
schools that must answer primarily to their boards of directors rather
than to the American people.
15 1
Another common criticism of voucher programs is that they can
exacerbate the poor conditions in schools that are already failing by
depriving those schools of students and funding.' 52 As more students
leave, conditions in failing schools might grow worse, providing motiva-
tion for the remaining students to accept vouchers. Followed to its logical
conclusion, this process could force many schools to close for lack of
students. However, if the failing schools are not providing students with
148. Id. at 1.
149. Vail, supra note 12, at 199.
150. McCarthy, supra note 69, at 1. To combat the concern that voucher pro-
grams will further segregate students by race, others claim that this is already the case,
with whites fleeing the cities and leaving a disproportionate number of black students
behind in the decaying urban schools. See Lewyn, The Urban Crisis, supra note 15, at
527-529.
151. See American Federation of Teachers, The Many Names of School Vouchers
(2001), available at http://www.aft.org/topics/vouchers/index.htm. The AFT proclaims
to "represent the economic, social and professional interest of classroom teachers." Ameri-
can Federation of Teachers, Who We Are, available at http://www.aft.orglabout/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 18, 2009). This is worth noting because some have questioned the
motives of public school teachers in opposing voucher programs, believing that the oppo-
sition stems more from a fear of a drop in union benefits and control rather than a real
criticism of the benefits of vouchers or concern for the education of the students
involved. See Don Brunell, School Vouchers Will Cut the Knot of Teacher Union Rules,
COVINGTON REPORTER, Jul. 18, 2009, available at http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/
newsroom/ShowNewsltem.do?id=80397.
152. See Kirkham, supra note 76, at 229 (noting critics' claim that vouchers
undermine the education system by removing good motivated students from public
schools, when such students often act as mentors to their peers); Vail, supra note 12, at
213. Moreover, the actual range of choices could evaporate if the government is allowed
to extensively regulate private schools which receive voucher students, especially consider-
ing that many parents favor the regulation of private schools should they participate in
voucher programs. Robert K. Vischer, Public Opinion and the Culture Wars: The Case of
School Vouchers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 477, 485 (2002). Were that to happen, it could
spread the bureaucratization and inefficiency problems of public schools to the private
system, with the result that there would no longer be any real difference between public
and private schools. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this note.
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the level of education guaranteed by the Constitution, what purpose are
they serving? Why keep failing schools open if they are not achieving the
purpose for which they were built?
153
States that are concerned that vouchers may lead to the breakdown
of their public school systems should remember that they are in the best
position to institute reform by bringing schools up to adequate standards,
thereby eliminating any necessity for vouchers. Moreover, the public
schools that are satisfying the educational needs of their students will
benefit from receiving new students and the voucher funds that come
with them. The number of middle-class families that are willing to move
to an entirely new neighborhood and pay much higher mortgages and
property taxes clearly shows how sought-after public schools can be, as
long as they deliver high-quality education.
Other opponents of vouchers consider the public school system as
instrumental in "equip[ping] students with the tools of citizenship" and
preserving the American ideal of equality.' 5 4 Interestingly, both sides of
the debate claim to be interested in equality: the opponents of vouchers
assert that voucher programs will increase the already apparent educa-
tional disparities between the poor and the wealthy, while the advocates
insist that it is the current system that relegates poor students to failing
schools.' 55 These advocates instead see vouchers as an opportunity for
poor students to gain access to better education.'
56
Studies of current voucher programs can be used to gain a more
objective view of vouchers' effects. Researchers have been studying the
effects of voucher programs on participating parents and teachers for
more than ten years and have published ten peer-reviewed, experimental
studies thus far.' 57 The results of these studies provide significant evi-
dence that at least some of the participating students experience academic
improvement due to the voucher program.
15
'
C. Other Effects
Finally, the very nature of vouchers-that they allow parents to
choose the mode of their children's education-is a benefit in and of
itself. Research overwhelmingly shows that voucher programs improve
the satisfaction of parents whose children are involved. 159 Cleveland's
voucher program, for example, gives parents the choice to "remain in
public school as before, remain in public school with publicly funded
153. See Andres, supra note 100, at 814.
154. Vischer, supra note 152, at 479.
155. Id. at 481.
156. Id.
157. Wolf, supra note 79, at 445.
158. Id.
159. Wolf, supra note 79, at 435.
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tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose a religious school, obtain a
scholarship and choose a non-religious private school, enroll in a com-
munity school, or enroll in a magnet school."16 This greater flexibility in
school choice allows parents to make vital decisions about their children's
education in a way not otherwise available to them.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The struggle of middle-class families to provide their children with
quality education will continue to grow as education costs continue to
rise. Some of these costs are due to the families investing ever increasing
percentages of their income to bid up the cost of housing in "good"
school districts. Other costs are due to changing perception among
Americans over how vital and necessary it is to obtain a college degree-a
fact that has driven and will, in all likelihood, continue to drive up the
cost of college tuition. Regardless of the source of the rising costs, mid-
dle-class families are feeling the financial squeeze. This financial squeeze
could be greatly lessened by combining the long accepted practice of
awarding merit-based scholarships to post-secondary students with the
more recent practice of awarding vouchers to families living in sub-stan-
dard school districts. Middle-class families, the majority of whom have
thus far been excluded from the need-based programs, could find a rem-
edy in a merit-based voucher system. Programs such as these would pass
the constitutional test delineated in Zelman, even if they included relig-
ious private schools. Moreover, they would still provide a real benefit to
middle-class families even in those states that choose not to include the
local religious private schools in the program. Putting educational dollars
into the hands of parents has proven beneficial to lower-income families,
and the time has come to give middle-class families that same
opportunity.
160. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
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